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Abstract 
 
In formal police interviews, interviewers may have institutionally mandated 
reasons for following up even apparently fully co-operative answers with  
questions that imply that the interviewee is in fact (knowingly or unknowingly) 
being uncooperative. From a sample of over 100 UK interviews with suspects 
arrested for minor offences, and 19 interviews with witnesses alleging sexual 
assault, we identify and analyse follow-up questions which do not presume that 
interviewees' apparently 'normal' answers respect the Gricean maxims of 
quantity, quality, relevance or manner. We identify three institutional 
motivations working to over-ride the normal communicative contract: to 'get the 
facts straight'; to prepare for later challenges; and pursue a description of events 
that more evidently categorizes the alleged perpetrators' behaviour as criminal. 
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Are answers to questions usually assumed to be co-operative? Certainly Grice's 
familiar principle (“make your conversational contribution such as is required ... by 
the accepted purpose or direction of the talk”, Grice, 1989, p. 26) seems to be 
generally assumed to be operative in everyday conversation. But rules for 
everyday conversational engagement are adapted when institutional frames (the 
court, the confessional, the surgical theatre, etc.) are in play. This article is about 
the adaptations visible in one particular institution, the formal police interview. 
 
There are many ways of conceiving of how institutions alter everyday norms. 
Drew and Heritage (1992b) give us a useful set of dimensions on which to 
distinguish everyday from institutional talk: the latter will have some 
predictable, known-to-participants objective; it will impose differential rights on 
what turns to take, and when to take them, on those involved; and it will require 
or constrain certain kinds of inferences that participants can make about each 
other’s' conduct. Our interest in this article is in those inferences, and, following 
Houtkoop (2000, chapter 4), how the assumption of cooperation fares under a 
certain combination of institutional objective and institutional constraint. 
Specifically, we shall be examining how the police interview allows (or indeed 
requires) the suspension of the Gricean presumption of co-operation (Grice 
1975/1989) between interlocutors.  
 
It is certainly not every institutional encounter that will set Gricean maxims to 
one side; the social cost of doubting one's interlocutor's co-operativeness is a 
high one to bear. But there will be some institutions which are willing to pay the 
price; or, to put it more analytically, there will be some institutional contexts 
whose inferential schemata (as Levinson, 1992, p 72 calls them) will require the 
interviewer to apply a less co-operative and more sceptical standard to what 
their interlocutors say.  
 
The institutions that seem likely candidates for such scepticism are those in 
which its representatives are mandated, by some higher authority, to pursue 
versions of events that may not be in the interlocutor's best interests to reveal, 
and which the interlocutor may be motivated to disguise by apparent (but 
misleading) co-operation. It's possible that scepticism may occasionally rear its 
head even in apparently non-adversarial encounters (e.g., a doctor might doubt 
the veracity of a patient's reports of their drinking or smoking, or a teacher 
might disbelieve a pupil's account for not doing their homework). A more 
promising environment might be the more aggressive brand of news 
interviewing (for which see, for example, Clayman et al, 2006, on the erosion of 
deference in  the White House press corps' questions over the years). Legal 
dispute in general may well be a felicitous environment for suspension of 
conversational cooperation (as argued, for example, by the legal scholar Andrei 
Marmor, e.g., Marmor, 2009, esp. ch. 5), But we have our eye on one institutional 
setting, the police interview, where there is a legal inferential framework that 
makes scepticism a sharply and standardly mandated obligation.  In this report, 
we detail how a police interviewer might question even ostensibly co-operative 
responses, and follow them up to seek out the most forensically complete 
version of events, whether in their interviewee’s favour or not. 
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The reason for choosing police interview is that the institutional demands of the 
interviewers' role are clear -  and have an intriguing internal conflict. The 
institutional obligations are formally set out in the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act (1984), usually referred to as PACE. How, though, to put this into practice? 
PACE is a legal statute, not designed for practical application, so working officers 
will turn to the College of Policing's documentation (here referred to for 
convenience as CoP) of authorised professional practices (College of Policing, 
n.d.) which sets standards of practical police work in England and Wales. That 
document gives extensive guidelines and detailed recommendations on 
interviewing, which expand on the drier legal statute PACE. The 
recommendations cover a great deal of ground, but there is a conflict at the heart 
of what they oblige the officer to do. These two extracts from CoP  illustrate what 
we mean: 
 
“Style matters because it affects the motivation of the 
interviewee to be accurate and relevant in their replies. 
Establishing a rapport means being genuinely open, interested 
and approachable, as well as being interested in the 
interviewee’s feelings or welfare.” (College of Policing, section 1; 
emphasis added).  
 
Even though the ostensible differences between the interests of a witness and a 
suspect (one neutral, one defensive) might suggest divergent treatment by the 
interviewing officer, in fact the guidelines overlap: the strictures on rapport and 
truth-seeking apply to both: 
 
"The aim of investigative interviewing is to obtain accurate and reliable 
accounts from victims, witnesses or suspects about matters under 
police investigation. 
To be accurate, information should be as complete as possible 
without any omissions or distortion. 
To be reliable, the information must have been given truthfully and be 
able to withstand further scrutiny, eg, in court." (College of Policing, 
Principle 1; emphasis added). 
 
Establishing rapport would normally involve assuming your interlocutor was 
playing to the same standards of co-operation as you were; but the officer is 
enjoined to make sure that what the interocutor says is complete, accurate and 
truthful, which implies that the officer will, at least sometimes, make the 
contrary assumption.   
 
The difference from everyday interlocutors' terms of engagement is signalled 
early on in the interviews, as the following typical exchange shows: 
 
Example 1 PN-651 
01  PO1:  F’the benefit of the tape can you please um:: say  
02        your full name an’ date o’birth for me please. 
03                     (0.4) 
                                                      
1 All names and other identifiers have been changed in the data shown in this article 
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04  SUS:  Wayne Tom Barker: twenty-first of the first eighty: 
 
As Stokoe (2009) argues, the preface “for the benefit of the tape”, makes it clear 
that here there are institutional reasons why normal presumptions about the 
question might be over-ridden, perhaps risking the rapport the interviewers 
might otherwise establish with the interviewee. That is the tension we shall be 
exploring in the article. The interviewees' answers to questions may look 
perfectly co-operative as to relevance, truth, extent, and manner of delivery ; but 
on occasion, the interviewer will issue a follow-up question which makes no such 
presumption, and puts rapport at risk. What do such exchanges look like, and 
what instituional purpose do they serve? 
 
Data 
 
Larger corpus: suspect interviews.  
This dataset2 comprises 118 interviews between different police officers and 
suspects in a constabulary area of the UK police service. Audio cassettes of old, 
completed crime cases were made available by police administrators, and were 
digitally recorded and anonymized on-site at a secure storage facility. Interviews 
ran for about an hour on average. Data Processing Agreements to work with the 
data were drawn up between the service and the authors' University. Names that 
could identify persons and places, including police officers, have been altered. Of 
the 122 recordings made available, 12 were unanalysable (because tape quality 
was too poor), and in 6 the suspect maintained 'no comment' throughout, or 
virtually throughout. This left 104 interviews which allowed us to identify 
pragmatically odd follow-up questions. More detailed information about these 
interviews is available in Stokoe and Edwards (2008). 
 
Smaller corpus: witnesses, with learning disabilities. A police force in England 
allowed us access to 20 videotapes of interviews, anonymized on-site, again from 
old and archived cases, but here involving witnesses with intellectual disabilities. 
The interviews were recorded between 2010 and 2013 by trained officers. 
Interviews lasted between 21 minutes and just over two hours. All witnesses 
were being questioned on their allegations of being sexually assaulted or raped. 
They all had some kind of what the police called “learning disability”, but the 
case files were very variable in specifying the interviewee’s specific diagnosis. Of 
the 20 recordings made available, one was incomplete. Interviews ran for over 
an hour on average. More detailed information about these interviews is 
available in Antaki et al (2016). 
 
Pre-Analysis: boundary cases 
 
In the extracts below, SUS and WIT denote interviews with suspects and with 
witnesses, respectively. Speakers are identified only as PO (police officer; PO1, 
PO2 if necessary) and either SUS or WIT.  
 
                                                      
2 The corpus was collected as part of ESRC grant number RES-148-25-0010 “Identities in 
neighbour discourse: Community, conflict and exclusion” held by Elizabeth Stokoe and Derek 
Edwards. 
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A note on transcription: the data extracts are presented in a light version of Gail 
Jefferson's notation, widely used in Conversation Analysis and other 
interactional studies.  Accessible guides to her notation conventions are 
published in a number of texts (eg. ten Have, 2007; Liddicoat, 2011) and a full 
exposition is given in Jefferson (2004)  
 
Boundary cases.  
Before we get to the analysis, there are two kinds of follow-up questions that the 
police interviewers ask which should be set aside from the ones that we're 
interested in. Although they come in the environment of a question being asked 
and answered, neither breaks the co-operative contract. 
 
a) Simple follow-ups. The obvious boundary case, of course, is the case where the 
PO follows up a straightforward answer- that is, those questions which probe at 
an answer that is following co-operative maxims in the expected way: not 
obviously a lie, saying as much as is required, saying it straightforwardly and 
relevantly to the question. In such cases, whatever the interviewer's apparent 
motivation in following it up, it is not suspicion that the interviewee is being un-
co-operative.  
 
Example 2. SUS 11 
 
168 07.30 PO1 pursues more information about the event 
01     PO1:   w- which pub had you been drinking in [er (  )  
02     S:                                             [erm,  
03            (.3) I’d been in the Black Swan. 
04                  (.5) 
05     PO1:   right, an- and how long (.3) had you been drinking  
06            in there 
07     S:     erm (.) I– I w- went in abou:t, (.6) >oh I dunno<,  
08            (.3) say (1.5) >dunno 'bout< (after/half) three:,  
09            (2.0)after three [(er   )   
10     PO1:                     [and what time did you come out. 
11                   (1.0) 
12     S:     >to be honest< I’m not sure really (.)  [I dunno  
13     PO1:                                             [mhm 
14     S:     maybe it’s probably– (1.0) (I’d say) (.) Pat or  
15            David would be able to (.) give you better time of  
16            that cuz (.) to be honest I’ve not got a watch on. 
17  PO1:   wh– who were you with (.) when you were drinking. 
 
In the above example, the suspect's responses to each of the PO's questions is - 
although occasionally vague - apparently acceptably detailed, apparently true, 
and so on; the reason for the interviewer’s follow-up question at line 17 is 
merely a matter of proceeding to collect further information about the suspect's 
drinking, not encompassed by the first question about physical location. 
 
b) Follow-ups warranted by obvious deficiencies or other un-cooperativeness in the 
answer. There is a more useful boundary case, where the PO issues a follow-up 
question which looks at first sight like the ones we go on analyse - but is in fact 
perfectly well warranted by the obviously uncooperative nature of the IE's 
previous answer.  
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Here PO's follow-up question is warranted by the referential ambiguity of what 
the IE said.  
 
Example 3. SUS 118, 04.3 
01   Sus:   Back to John’s t- (2.0) have dinner with his family.  
02          .hhh [.hhh 
03   Pol:        ['kay, (.) wh- who does John- (.)John live there  
04          with.  
05                (.3)  
06   PO:    [you say his wife’s left [him. 
07   Sus:   [Ye-                       [yeah, (.) he lives there  
08          on his own.  
10               (.3) 
11   Pol:   really,= 
12   Sus:   =Yeah.  
13                (.3) 
14   Pol:   so who d'ju have dinner with.  
15                (1.5) 
16   Sus:   er- (.) his son, wife and two kids.  
17                (.7)   
18 Pol:   what, h- hi- his son’s wife. 
 
The suspect has said that Keith lived on his own, but that makes having dinner 
with him and his son, wife and two kids an obvious puzzle, resolved by a simple 
follow-up question at line 18 with a candidate answer (it's Keith's son's wife, not 
Keith's). 
 
Example 4. WIT 14, 15.55 
01   PO:  When you got off the bus-stop, (.) w- where exactly  
02        were you, >we’re just trying to< [figure out where   
03   WIT:                                    [at the bus-stop,  
04  PO:  you were.=you were at the bus-stop, but where is the  
05        bus stop,  
06   WIT: the bus-stop’s like – because you can cross the road 
07        (continues) 
 
In Example 4 above, again there is a simple deficiency in the IE's answer - it 
manifestly doesn't add anything (it fails the maxim of quantity) and the puzzle is 
again addressed by a simple next question (line 4). 
 
Now let us turn to the corpus of interest. Our rule for inclusion was 
straightforward: we took in any exchange that featured a sceptical follow-up to 
an ostensibly co-operative answer to a question. The crucial point in all of the 
cases below is that the interviewee seems to have answered a police officer's 
question co-operatively, speaking relevantly, truthfully and plainly, and saying as 
much as is required. So the officer's follow-up can't be attributed to any obvious 
pragmatic deficiency in the interviewee’s answer. What do such exchanges look 
like, and what institutional interests might they serve? 
 
Analysis 
 
First, we give examples, for illustration and without much commentary, of 
follow-up questions which query the adherence to cooperative maxims of 
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(apparently unexceptionable) answers. Then we move on to show more 
analytically what institutional benefits such questions yield. 
 
Examples of follow-ups which query adherence to Quantity 
The interviewer, on occasion, did not treat the interviewee as having said all that 
they ought - even though (it seems to us intuitively) that what the question asks 
for would normally have been easily inferable, without effort, from the answer.  
 
Example 5. SUS 3, 390, 16.41 "slap"  
01    S:  I think- (.3) she turned round and pushed me,=and she  
          (swung for me) (.) but I,  
03   PO:  right 
04   SUS: I ts- don’t know how, but ah d- - I kind of like  
05        stepped back from her,  
06   PO:  ri[ght, 
07   SUS:   [and .h I either punched her or slapped her. (.) 
08        [I can’t remember. 
09   PO2: [Right. s' y- you'v-  
10                  (.8) 
11 PO2: so, s' >you say you've punched her< or slapped her  
12      >but how was it<, w- was that with your hand? 
13   SUS: Yeah. 
 
Slapping or punching would ordinarily and automatically entail using (only) the 
hand - yet PO asks (lines 11-12) for explicit confirmation. (Recall that we offer no 
further analysis at this point - that comes after we've set all these out as 
examples of scepticism about each of the maxims) 
 
Example 6. SUS 24, 186, 5.34 "car" 
01   PO:   Can I ask yer who else was in the car with yer. 
02                 (.5) 
03   SUS:  Me girlfriend. 
04 PO:   Jus' you and your girlf [riend. 
05   SUS:                           [yeah.  
 
Here the PO ignores the usual presumption that SUS's answer respects the 
maxim of quantity, and specifies everyone who qualified as being in the car.  
 
Example 7. WIT 10, 260, 08.40  "nightie" 
01    PO:   So: (.) you were in bed,  
02   WIT:   mhm (nods) 
03    PO:   and you: said you had your nightie on, 
04   WIT:   [yeah. 
05 PO:    [did you have anything else on. 
06                 (7.0) 
08   WIT:   my knickers¿  
09    PO:   [okay, 
10   WIT:   [always wear knickers in bed, always. 
11  PO:   okay.=anything else other than your nightie then  
12          and your knickers. 
13                 (3.0) 
14   WIT:   nothing else, no. 
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And here again the PO (twice) ignores the presumption that the witness had 
listed all the relevant information (in this case, wearing a nightie would, we 
think, normally not entail wearing other items of clothing; wearing the nightie 
plus knickers still less so). 
 
Examples of follow-ups which query adherence to Quality  
At the less interesting end of this continuum of quality-querying PO's questions 
are those that treat an apparently full response as requiring  simple 
"clarification". To do so, of course, implies that the answer was uncooperative (in 
truth-telling), plausible though it might have looked in everyday conversation 
between peers. The two examples below show the PO following up in this mode, 
the first with a formulation (Heritage and Watson 1980) and the latter with a 
yes-preferring polar question (Raymond, 2003). 
 
Example 8. SUS 19, 429, 14.20 "hit" 
01    PO1:   .hh did- (.3) uh::: diduh– did anyone hit– did you  
02           or him hit each other. 
03    SUS:   no(h). 
04  PO1:   so you didn’t hit him and he didn’t hit you. 
05    SUS:   yeah. 
 
Example 9. SUS 21, 166, 06.20 "with anyone" 
01    PO1:  were you with anyone? 
02                 (0.6) 
03    SUS:  was I (   ) anyone.   
04                  (1.5) 
05    SUS:  no.  
06                  (0.5) 
07  PO1:  you were on your own. 
08    SUS:  yeah.  
 
The more interesting end of the spectrum of quality follow-ups are those where 
the confirmation is not a mere check of what has been explicitly said, but brings 
out something that is already (and normally "obviously") implicated by the 
suspect's previous answer (- and, as we shall later see, that something is legally 
important). Here is an example: 
 
Example 10. SUS 52, 178, 05.40 
01   PO1:  so- (.) where've you seen the van before, then. 
02   SUS:  driving round.   
03                   (0.5) 
04   SUS:  well there’s numerous- (.) Ford (.) little white  
05         (.) courier van things. .hhh  
06   PO1:  mmm. 
07   SUS:  ‘cus that’s what it is, a little white courier van. 
08   PO1:  but you’ve not been in thi:s one. 
09   SUS:  (sniff) no. 
10 PO1:  no¿ you’ve not driven this one. 
11   SUS:  nope. 
 
SUS not "being in" this van obviously implies, a fortiori, not driving it; 
nevertheless PO treats him as not having told the truth, and ups the ante by 
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specifically putting that (more criminally serious) version of events to him (- and 
this is the kind of institutional objective we shall spell out later).  
 
Examples of follow-ups which query adherence to Manner 
There were some cases in our data where the manner in which the IE designed 
their answer, though it would (probably) pass in everyday British English 
conversation as being merely ordinarily euphemistic, was treated by the police 
interviewer as uncooperatively failing the maxim of manner rather than merely 
flouting it for ordinary effect. 
 
Example 11. SUS 51, 451, 19.28 
01    PO1:  what about the trees. 
02                   (2.0) 
03    SUS:  .hhh (.5) w' I just ds- took s- – I thought  
04          I just took a couple of swi:pes at about two  
05          (.) 'r three: (   ) (.5) (and then about (  )(1.5)  
06          then some officers came. 
07                   (1.0) 
08  PO1:  d'ju hit any of the trees. 
09                    (.5) 
10    SUS:  yeah. 
 
Here the SUS's "couple of swipes" would pass muster, probably not even as any 
sort of euphemism, in everyday talk; but the PO treats it as evading the more 
explicit (and criminally relevant) "hit". 
 
In the next example, the interviewee is a witness alleging being raped in a prison 
cell. 
 
Example 12. WIT 13, 769, 40.50 
01     WIT:  ... the more you kept saying no, the more (.3) he  
02           seemed ter: .h (.3) get- (.) turned on:, or, (.3) it  
03           seemed to get- (.5) I noticed every time >I kept saying  
04           no<, he kept getting (.) his: (.)thingy gettin'  
05           (bigger)  
06     P01:  right,  okay,=  
07     WIT   =bigger, an jus' 
08   PO1:  >what y' sayin, what d'ju mean< his thingy kept getting 
09           [bigger and bigger, 
10     WIT:  [(uh- he-) 
11                      (1.5) 
12    WIT:   his penis was jus' kep gettin'- jus' seemed to 
13           kept gettin'- (.5) ev'ry time he- sortuv- I don't 
14           know (1.5) whether (2.) something happened in his 
15           own sortuv (3.0) childhood [... continues] 
                       ((3 lines omitted)) 
19 P01:    >but when you talked about 'is<, when you- when you  
20           talked about it getting bigger and bigger, what  
21           do you mean¿ 
 
'His thingy' would be understood as a polite - but obvious - euphemism in 
everyday British talk; but PO at line 8 treats it as inappropriate in style and 
requires the witness himself to pronounce the word "penis". And again at line 19, 
PO insists on not treating "getting bigger and bigger" as a proper description, 
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presumably angling for the more recordable "erect". The objective is, as before, 
to record (literally: in the case of vulnerable witnesses, the tape is played as 
evidence) an account that makes the alleged offence as unambiguous as possible.  
Again, this is a hint of the analysis to come. 
 
Examples of follow-ups which query adherence to Relevance 
Occasionally in the data, even such an allegedly fundamental (Sperber and 
Wilson 1986, and subject to a long debate since then; see for example Moeschler, 
2013) principle as relevance seems to be disputable in some circumstances. For 
example, in the case below, the interviewee gives an answer that would (we 
think) pass muster as at least tangentially informative about the question, but 
the PO nevertheless challenges it: 
 
Example 13. SUS 62, 71, 03.33 
01   PO:   do:: (.5) >your kids<, (.3) what school do your kids  
02         go to.   
03   SUS:  Fordleigh Primary School. 
04   PO1:  an', ss- (.) do you know i- (.) if Laura’s got any  
05         kids: (.) that attend that school. 
06                (.7) 
07   SUS:  (hh hh) I know I’ve seen the two (.4) kids.   
08   SUS:  [but I don’t know their names.   
09   PO1:  [>a'right< 
10   PO1:   >okay< (.) right=an' they go- they go to the same  
11          primary school as your children? 
12   SUS:   yeah. 
 
SUS's claim that she's 'seen' the two kids but doesn't know their names, might 
normally allow the inference that she (also) doesn't know whether they go to the 
same school as hers. But PO treats her answer as not relevant to the question, 
and reissues it explicitly (and indeed discovers that the 'normal' implicature 
would have been quite wrong). In the example below, SUS disputes the premise 
of the PO's question, but his challenge is taken to be irrelevant: 
 
Example 14. SUS 104, 164, 10.40 
01    PO1:  right. .hhhh >what your neighbour’s then< said is  
02          whilst he’s (.23) on his k nees, he’s looked up (.) 
03          and he’s seen you clenching your right fist. (.) at  
04          that point he’s put his ha:nds in front of his head. 
05                   (1.5) 
06    PO1:    .hh do you recall that?  
07                   (3.0) 
08    SUS:    ('av I) what.  
09                   (2.0) 
10    PO1:    when he was on his knees, (.) did you clench  
11            your fist in front of 'im. 
12    SUSS:   I never seen him on his knees. 
13  PO1:    did you clench your fist.  
14                   (6.0) 
15    SUS:    yes. 
 
By reissuing did you clench your fist, PO dismisses SUS's answer as not relevant, 
and - as above - brings out a more damaging admission. 
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Having seen a bare list of examples of the kind of follow-up questions we have in 
our sights, let us now move to considering the institutional objectives that they 
might be serving.  
 
 
The institutional benefits of querying apparently unexceptionable answers  
 
a) Testing, or establishing, the credibility or completeness of the account 
 
The most basic imperative for the interviewing officers, in both the suspect and 
the witness cases, is to get the facts straight. The imperatives will be different, 
but overlapping; the suspects may want to elide the more criminal aspects of the 
events, and the witnesses may be confused (especially in this particular sample 
of interviews, when they are both intellectually impaired and are also reliving 
some distressing experiences). As in all the other cases, it is the PO's brief - while 
trying to maintain rapport with their interviewee - not to presume that what 
looks like their fully co-operative answer is actually as informative or as well-
grounded as it seems.  
 
In the example below, even what seems to be a wholly complete, neutral answer 
to an apparently routine question is not taken at face value by the PO: 
 
Example 15. SUS 113a, 218, 9.16  
01    PO1:  s- so ba:sically, as your first account, (.3) y- you'd-  
02          w- what obviously is on the tape, uh- an' you say that  
03          er- you’d not been getting on too well with yer- your 
04          other half.=>can you just clarify what her name  
05          is< (.) for me? 
06    SUS:  it’s June Mason. 
07    PO1:  June Mason. 
08    SUS:  yeah. 
09                   (1.0) 
10  PO1:  's– (.5) is 'ere– >has she got another names< (.) 
11          [(or something) 
12    SUS:  [Jennifer. 
 
In the witness cases, the PO's concern to get the story straight may even lead to 
an exchange like the one below, which queries the witness's most basic authority 
in having evidence to back up her experience: 
 
Example 16.WIT 1, 446, 16.25 
01    PO1:  and that's from, (1.0) the bus stop— what's the road,   
02          (.) that the- the— 
03    WIT:  Hamfield Road. 
04    PO1:  Hamfield Road. 
05    WIT:  yeah. 
06  PO1:  how do you know. 
07    WIT:  s- c'z I memorised it, it’s got the station on. 
 
As this is a comparatively bland institutional objective (getting the story straight 
will be a requirement of many other institutional encounters, from primary-care 
history-taking (e.g. Maynard and Heritage 2005) to telephone helplines (e.g. 
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Hepburn et al, 2014), we shan't dwell on them here but move on to institutional 
objectives more specific to the police: eliciting evidence. 
 
At this point we might profitably look across to a rather different take on very 
similar data - Heydon's (2005) treatment of topic-shifting questions in police 
interviews. Heydon is concerned to reveal the directive power placed in the 
hands of the interviewer by the authority of their insitutional role, and one 
mechanism she identifies is topic-shifting. Consider this example (which we 
reproduce with much simplification of Heydon's transcription): 
 
Reproduced from Heydon, 2005, p 107: 
Suspect: the only thing I got was a CD and a roast from the fridge 
PO: right why'd you take the roast in the fridge 
Suspect: I was hungry 
PO: all right did you take a Metallica tape from the bedroom 
 
Heydon's interest is in the "all right" in the last line, and uses it to indicate a 
"shift of footing back to the original line of questioning" (Heydon p 107).  Since 
the Gricean angle is not part of Heydon's objective (identifying structural stages 
in the interviews via topic-shift), she doesn't remark on the Gricean challenge 
involved. The suspect had - ostensibly - reported all that he had taken was a CD 
and a roast, but the interviewer checks a further item, treating the suspect as 
having failed the maxim of quantity in giving only a partial list of what he took. 
The more general approach to the overall structure of the interview - which is 
Heydon's general project - misses this more fine-grained analysis, but the two 
are nicely compatible. 
 
 
b) Preparing for more challenging questions later 
 
In many cases, the PO's follow-up question is not so much designed to reveal a 
more criminal intention or set of consequences (the interview isn't at that point 
in the proceedings) so much as to build up a narrative that may (sooner or later) 
lead to contradictions, inconsistencies or other implausibilities that can be put to 
the interviewee.  
 
Here is an example where the follow-up question to an apparently 
unexceptionable answer yields an immediate challenge of inconsistency. 
 
Example 17. SUS 111b, 59, 3.00 
01  PO1:  and where was that from. 
02  SUS:  the: Winestore. 
03             (.3) 
04  PO1:  at Tamleigh? 
05  SUS:  Mmm-hmm. 
06  PO1:  okay. (.) so (.) tha- that’s the only thing that  
07        you bought from there, [is it. 
08  SUS:                          [yeah. 
09  PO1:  Okay. ..h b'cz-(.) because someone’s made an  
10        allegation that al- you know, alcohol’s been supplied  
11        >to the kids<, .h erm we will be checking up at (.3) the 
12        Tamleigh (.) erm Winestore because they’ve got a CCTV  
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13        there.   
14  SUS:  mhm. 
15  PO1:  erm (2.5) so if y- if (you/they) have bought more  
16        than: (.) >what you’re saying<, you need to tell us now¿ 
17                   (1.5) 
18  SUS:  yea:h, I did buy more.=I bought another bottle of wine, 
        [... continues] 
 
SUS's previous answer (not shown above) about what she had bought from the 
shop, though not obviously implausible, is queried by PO (at line 6) with a yes-
projecting tag question (Heritage and Raymond, 2005). Her confirmation allows 
PO then to launch an immediate potential contradiction which SUS has to deal 
with; and she does so by conceding that, in fact, she did buy more (line 18). 
In the case below, the IE's answer is not taken as being of sufficient quality 
(though it seems firmly enough presented). IE saw nobody and spoke to nobody 
at the location of the alleged events. But PO pursues the issues, and introduces "a 
lady"  who will, it transpires, later be a source of a witness statement implicating 
the suspect in a crime. The officer's first probe (line 7) is unnecessary if the SUS's 
first answer is to be accepted (if he hadn't seen anyone, he is unlikely to have 
spoken to anyone) but it serves to cement the denial and provide a basis for a 
starker challenge. 
 
Example 18. SUS 38 145 , 4.40 
01    PO1:   so would you have walked past the rear of  
02           >one 'undred< Colley Carson, 
03    SUS:   yeah. 
04    PO1:   okay, .hh and did you see anyone there. 
05                (.3) 
06    SUS:   nobody. 
07 PO1:   Didj' speak to anybody?  
08                (.3) 
09    SUS:   Nope.  
10                (1.0) 
11    PO1:   right, okay.   
12                (3.0) ((paper rustling)) 
13  PO1:   did you see a lady in the back garden of  
14         >one 'undred< Colley Carson Lane. 
15    SUS:   (nuh:). 
 
The second, and more specific, probe (lines 13-14) introduces "a lady" who 
becomes useful later in the interview, when PO confronts SUS with a direct 
report of his having been in that location, and committed various acts: 
 
Example 19 (continuation after about 20 lines, from Example 18 immediately 
above) 
 
35   PO1:   .hh right, she says that on (.5) Sun – er, on was it,  
36          Monday the 26th about 9.30 she was in, er, (.3) the  
37          rear garden to let her dogs out,  
38          [material deleted]  
39          ((reading)) she heard you shout, [...] if I get charged  
40          for doing the window I will cause criminal damage to your  
41          house and you’ll know about it.  [... continues] 
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The follow-up, then , can be useful in preparing for a challenge (always in the 
direction of more incriminating evidence) of the IE's version of events, even if 
stated confidently. The next and last of the objectives we identify, however, goes 
a step further. 
 
c) Bringing forth more material relevant to a chargeable offence 
 
The most institutionally powerful use of follow-up questions is to elicit 
something which would help identify what criminal charge might be brought 
(either against the suspect in the interview, or, in the case of witnesses, against 
the alleged perpetrator). In Example 5 the "slap" was with the hand (rather than 
an object, so likely to lead to a lesser charge), in 11 the suspect admits hitting 
rather than swiping (so likely to be vulnerable to a more serious charge), and in 
12 "thingy" in the witness's account gets translated into "penis" to better 
function as evidence in a charge of sexual assault. Let us look in more detail at 
other examples. 
 
Intention. In some cases the drive behind PO's question was, as with "silly 
questions" (Stokoe and Edwards, 2008), getting on tape an admission from the 
suspect that his or her actions were performed with the intention to produce, or 
foreknowledge of, "various consequences (break, snap, smash), whose nature 
can be formulated or re-formulated forensically (e.g. as ‘criminal damage’)" 
(Stokoe and Edwards, 2008, 108). That is nicely illustrated in the case below, 
where SUS's apparently firm description of events is not taken as being of 
sufficient quality (- in other words, PO treats it as untruthful) in terms of its 
implications of intention.  
 
Example 20. SUS 23, 253, 9.55 
01   POL:  did you– >I’ll ask you again<, did you notice any  
02         damage to the door after you threw the hammer. 
03   SUS   no. 
04                (.5) 
05   POL:  no. >but did you< notice that it connected with the  
06         door.  
07                (1.5) 
08   SUS:  (wha'-) 
09   POL:  an di- did you see: (.3) the hammer that you (.3) 
10         th:rew (.3) connect, with Kevin’s front door.  
11                (1.5) 
12   SUS:  no,  all I done was chucked it.  
13   SUS:  all I know is his front door was shut, he’s got a  
14         blue front doo:r, I don’t know- (.)  I couldn’t  
15         tell yuh.   
16   SUS:  I haven’t got a clue. 
17 POL:  you can’t >remember.=did you throw it< at the front  
18         door. 
19   SUS:  .hh I wasn’t aiming for the front door, all I know  
20          is I chucked it.  [.. continues] 
 
PO works up to his final question (line 17) in this stretch by first establishing 
that there might be damage to the door, or, failing an answer in the affirmative, 
that the hammer might at least have connected with the door. This also fails to 
solicit an admission, so the PO issues a bald direct question did you throw it at 
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the front door?. "Throw at" would entail intention, so - were she to assent - make 
the SUS liable to a more aggravated charge. 
Consequences In other cases of follow-up questions, it is not the intent of the act, 
but the nature of the act itself and its likely consequences.  In the example below, 
the follow-up question (to, as always, an apparently unexceptionably complete 
answer) reveals a much more damaging description of events. 
Example 21.  SUS 36, 121 
01    PO:   an’ so you wen’ over to ’is ’ouse, 
02                 (0.5) 
03    SUS:  knocked on the door:= 
04    PO:   =You knocked on the door.=did you,  
05                 (0.8) 
06    PO:   how did you knock on the door. 
07                 (0.5) 
08    SUS:  I knocked first then I- (0.6) like that 
09          ((bumping sound)) 
10                 (0.3) 
11   PO:   with your fe:et.=>f’the benefit of the tape< 
12          you’re jus’ showin’ me gesturing that you (0.2) 
13          was kickin’ the door with your feet.= 
14          =((thumping sound))= 
15    SUS: =Yeh. 
 
An ordinary interlocutor might have assumed (given the maxim of quantity) that 
SUS was saying all he needed to, i.e. that he was just  knocking at his neighbour's 
door normally, with knuckles; but on PO's probing, it turns out that he used his 
feet as well (a usage hard to square with "knock", which at a push might extend 
to ringing a bell,  pressing a buzzer, or rattling the letter-box; not kicking). Note 
that even then, the SUS avoids naming the action, in favour of miming it; it is left 
to the PO actually to articulate it as "kicking the door with your feet". 
Witness examples 
While it is obviously likely that POs will put follow up questions to this sort of 
incriminating use when the interviewee is a suspect, one might not predict that 
they would do so when the interviewee was a witness (indeed one alleging being 
the victim of a distressing crime). But here there is a need to establish the 
chargeability of someone, even if not the person being interviewed. Hence a 
follow-up question like the one below, when the witness is asked for information 
that would imply that the alleged perpetrator knew what he was doing. 
Example 22. WIT 6, 1116, 31.20  
01     POL:   kay, .hh an- can you tell me about tha:t,  
02           about the pushing away. 
03                  (1.5) 
04     WIT:   I tried (.) pushin' him away but he w- wouldn’t  
05            go. 
06   POL:   okay, and how did you try that, what did you do. 
07     WIT:   I used my hands,  
08     POL:   so you've (.) pointed out two hands, so what  
09            have you done with your hands. 
10     WIT:   I pushed him. 
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The witness's answer that she tried 'pushing him away' would normally be 
taken, without second thought, to imply that she used her hands (it would be odd 
to imagine that "push" in this context would involve any other part of the body); 
but PO does not rely on that inference, and issues a further (open-ended) 
question at line 6. Although the witness now gives what sounds like a clear 
answer, the PO settles the matter by themselves articulating "two hands" for the 
benefit of the tape (see above for the way such formulas enter the police tapes). 
That puts beyond doubt that she acted normally, disarming any subsequent 
claim that the witness might have meant some less conventionally-obvious sense 
of 'pushing', which, if it came to court, defence counsel could argue was easily 
misconstruable by their client. 
Example 23 below is  more graphic. Here the witness seems insistent on keeping 
to a euphemism - allowable in everyday conversation - but is pressed by the PO 
to use a more formal word. 
Example 23. WIT 6, 810, 25.10 
01    POL:  okay.=where’s he put it. 
02                 (1.4)  
03    WIT:  down below. 
04                 (0.5) 
05    POL:  okay.=you say down below, where’s down below. 
06                 (1.0)  
07    WIT:  don't know.  
08                 (0.5)  
09    POL:  what- what’s that called down below. 
10                 (0.7) 
11    WIT:  (don't know.) 
12                (0.5) 
13    POL:  pardon? 
14    WIT:  don’t know. 
15    POL:  what do you call it¿ 
16                (3.5) 
17    WIT:  vagina. 
   
At lines 3, 7 and 11, the witness falls back on "don't know", which might be true; 
she might not have been taught the anatomical names of her private parts, or 
might have forgotten them. So PO might accept that the witness is admitting to 
failing the quality maxim (perhaps specifically the sub-maxim of having an 
evidential base (Grice 1989 p 27) . Nevertheless PO pursues the matter, and 
eventually gets the witness to pronounce the word vagina, disarming a possible 
later quibble about exact location,  that the alleged perpetrator's defence counsel 
might raise. 
 
Contrast case  
 
In a very few cases, the course of the interview will reveal that the PO should 
have doubted the cooperativeness of the IE's original answer - but didn't . In the 
case below, the IE's answer at line 10 indicate that she was alone when she 
entered the park, yet it becomes clear two turns later that, in fact, she was at that 
point accompanied by the person who she alleges would later assault her. 
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Example 24.  WIT 14, 309, 17.45 
01    PO1:   so you’ve (.3) you've got off the bus:, (.) you’ve then  
02           lit a fag (.3) and then you’ve then walked, into the  
03           gates, which are green gates:, [.hh into the actual  
04    WIT:                                   [mm  
05    PO1:   park itself is [that right.  
06    WIT:                   [yeh.  
07   PO1:    yeh. .hh (.) and (.5) were you-(.3) there by  
08            yourself at that point?  Was there anybody with you?  
09                      (.5) 
10    WIT:  no.   
11                      (7.0) 
12      PO1:  so- (.) you go into the park, tell me what you  
13            did next. 
14    WIT:  we: (j's) wal:ked (.) into the park, jus' walking  
15            around.  
16                      (.5)  
17      PO1:  n' you say- you said that we walked into the park, 
18            (.3) where was he.  
19      WIT:  he was next to me.   
20      PO1:  right, okay.=at what point did you meet him and where,  
21      WIT:  at the park.   
22      P01:  right. w- where exactly was that in the park.  
23      WIT:  (out/at) the front, (.5) at the front where the  
24             gates were.   
25      PO1:  right okay.=>sorry I got a bit< confused there because  
26            I thought you’d walked into the park, by yourself.  
 
The PO quickly recognises that there is a contradiction in WIT's account between 
lines 10 and 14, and at that point probes further (and later explains why she has 
done so). It is a rare case of significant information being (at first) missed 
because the the interviewer assumed that the interviewee was abiding by the 
maxims of co-operation - although (for reasons of her intellectual disability, or 
just ordinary mis-speaking) she wasn't. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
Institutional constraints on conversation necessarily distort the everyday 
contract that people have with each other, and such distortions may entail a 
problem for the institutional representatives. In the case of police interviewers, 
the standing orders of the UK College of Policing interviewing guidelines require 
that a balance be struck between establishing rapport with the interviewee 
(whether suspect or witness) and extracting the fullest amount of forensically 
relevant information. This article set out to discover how, in formal police 
interviews, the interviewer on occasion decided the dilemma in favour of 
suspending the presumption of their interlocutors' co-operation, in spite of the 
risk to rapport with the interviewee. 
 
The Gricean presumption of co-operative conversation would normally be in 
force in everyday interaction, and arguably also in institutions where the 
interviewer has no mandate to arrive at a version of events that might be being 
knowingly occluded by the interlocutor. Houtkoop, for example, shows how the 
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survey interviewer will, on occasion, design their questions optimistically (thus 
reading and writing, you've managed all right? [Houtkoop, 1995 p 595]); Heritage 
and Lindstrom (1998) first charted UK health visitors' personnel's use of what 
they called 'optimistic format' questions, and this has long been familiar as a 
feature of primary care medical consultation (thus, about giving birth: you didn't 
have forceps, Boyd and Heritage (2006, p 175). In those cases it might well be 
argued that the practitioner’s institutional objectives to build rapport and get the 
required information (for the survey, for the diagnosis) go reasonably well hand 
in hand3. 
 
But the special forensic status of police interviews makes scepticism a more 
efficient strategy4. Sometimes this 'efficiency' may actually reveal more 
exculpatory, rather than incriminating, evidence; Howarth (2017) gives a vivid 
case-study of an interviewer providing a suspect with questions that solicited a 
more innocent version of events than had theretofore emerged (rather than, as in 
our cases, the questions tending to presume and reveal more guilt). She argues 
that - given this was a rape suspect - ”this went beyond testing whether a valid 
defence might exist and towards actively constructing one” (p. 18), although 
accepts that it might nevertheless be true. One way or the other, though, her 
study underscores the directive power of the interviewers' questions - in her 
case, towards benign information; in ours, just the reverse.  
 
We concentrated on police officers' follow-up questions, specifically those that 
seemed to query what would (in everyday conversation) seem to be wholly 
unexceptionable answers. Thus the interviewee might be asked (as in Example 
6)  if who was with them in the car, and would reply my girlfriend; in non-
institutional settings this would be taken to be the whole truth, on the 
assumption that the interviewee was observing normal Gricean maxims. But 
here the police interviewer did not make that assumption, and asked explicitly 
whether there was anyone else in the car too.  
 
We identified three institutional benefits delivered by such sceptical probings of 
apparently unexceptionable answers. The most neutral was simply ironing out 
the basic run of events, to straighten everyday narrative into the kind of detailed 
chronology that would be appropriate for the court. That was perhaps the most 
expectable and standard effect, quite consistent with the requirements of PACE 
and the College of Policing's guidelines on interviewing. More tendentiously, a 
probe served to get the suspect to confirm their own version of events, so that 
the police interviewer could then more tellingly reveal a contradiction with other 
evidence. Most directly in line with the forensic nature of the interview, probes 
of apparently normal answers could yield a version of events that indicated more 
clearly what criminal charge could be brought (whether against the suspect 
being interviewed, or against the perpetrator by whom the witness alleged they 
had been assaulted). In a number - but not all -  of the cases we listed, the PO's 
scepticism was in fact justified. The original answer would in such cases turn out 
to be deficient in quantity (that the suspect had in fact bought more alcohol than 
                                                      
3 Though see, for example, Nielsen (2016) on how that can be disrupted by doctors' use of 
information technology to check records etc. during the consultation 
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they originally claimed), manner (the suspect had in fact hit a tree, not swiped it) 
and relevance (the suspect's denial that he had not seen his alleged victim on his 
knees didn't answer the question of whether he clenched his fist - which he did).  
 
That police interviewers have robust powers of questioning is hardly a new 
discovery - scholarly studies such as Howarth's (see above) regularly reveal new 
subtleties in the kind of force revealed by Heydon's pioneering account (Heydon 
2005). The point of what we were able to identify here is the specific one of the 
use of counter-Gricean questioning and so help locate just what it is about police 
interviews  (among other interviews, such as aggressive news interviews, where 
the need for information trumps the need to stay friendly) that strikes one as 
being 'hostile' . Unlike the news interview, here the interviewer's objectives are 
legally entailed, and that perhaps explains why, in the overwhelming majority of 
cases in our data, interviewees seem not to be  audibly upset by the questions or 
offer particular resistance to them5. This must remain speculation, of course, and 
we only have access to the audio-tape, and can make no confident judgement 
about what people really felt. Nevertheless, it may be that the paraphernalia of 
the interview set  up, its location in the police station, and the reading-out of the 
caution at the start of proceedings, seems to cement in all participants’ minds 
that, unlike the everyday world, here the presumption of co-operativeness may 
be suspended without notice.  
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